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11 Saving Behavior in Ten 
Developing Countries 
Susan M. Collins 
11.1 Introduction 
The 1987 World Development Report (World Bank 1987) noted that gross 
domestic savings, as a share of income, ranged from 31% to 33% in Korea, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia, while Singapore saved 42% of GDF!' In contrast, 
the highest saving rate for a Latin American developing country was 26% for 
Mexico. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela saved 16%,22%, 17%, 
and 24% respectively. For comparison, saving rates were 16% in the United 
States and 32% in Japan. Why do the developing countries in Asia save so 
much? Were Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia outliers? Have they always had 
high saving rates? Did the savings come primarily from the government, cor- 
porate, or household sector? 
This paper examines saving behavior in nine Asian developing countries 
plus Turkey since the early 1960s. The paper has two primary objectives. The 
first is to present a variety of facts about saving and other key variables. The 
times-series data used were collected for each country. Unfortunately, data 
problems are notorious both in measuring savings and in many developing 
countries. It is especially difficult to make cross-country comparisons. While 
the empirical findings should be interpreted with caution, they do indicate 
trends and differences in saving across countries and within countries over 
time. The findings that seem most likely to be robust to improved savings 
indicators concern shifts in saving behavior within particular countries over 
time. In fact, many of these countries have experienced striking shifts. 
Section 11.2 of the paper provides a first look at the data. It highlights the 
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roles of economic growth rates, the standard of living, and the age distribution 
of the population as determinants of saving. In particular, it points to a central 
role for dependency ratios-the percentage of the population aged 14 or 
younger. In fact, the high savers tended to have high growth rates and to have 
experienced a dramatic decline in fertility rates, reducing their dependency 
ratios. 
The second objective of the paper is to empirically examine the determi- 
nants of saving across these 10 countries and over time. The empirical work 
builds on the extensive literature on saving behavior in developing countries. 
A number of authors have examined the impact of demographic factors on 
saving in developing countries. See Hammer (1985) for a survey. Early cross- 
section studies (see Leff 1980 for a review and update) concluded that depen- 
dency ratios were an important determinant of differences in saving behavior. 
Later work (e.g., Ram 1982) took issue with these results. Empirically, saving 
seemed to be negatively correlated with dependency rates among developed 
countries, but positively correlated among developing countries. 
In a series of recent papers, Mason (e.g., 1988; and Mason et al. 1986) 
argued that these equations are misspecified because the effect of dependency 
rates (and other variables) on savings depends on the economic growth rate. 
Declining dependency ratios should tend to lower savings in slow-growing 
economies but to raise savings in rapidly growing economies. His empirical 
estimates did show saving rates negatively related to dependency rates for four 
Asian countries. But these results were based on annual observations. As dis- 
cussed further in sections 11.2 and 11.5 of this paper, year-to-year fluctua- 
tions in saving rates seem to be closely tied to agricultural inventories and to 
exhibit considerable measurement error. Therefore, it is preferable to consider 
time averages. 
The third section of this paper sets out a version of the life-cycle model of 
saving behavior to illustrate the effects of growth, dependency rates, and other 
variables on aggregate savings. The model follows Mason (1987, 1988) in 
emphasizing that socioeconomic factors and the economic growth rate might 
influence saving interactively. 
The saving equation is used in section 11.4 to econometrically examine 
saving in the 10 countries. Five-year time averages are used. The empirical 
estimates suggest that growth rates, demographic factors, and the standard of 
living account for a substantial portion of saving behavior across countries 
and over time. They also point to the importance of the interaction effects 
between growth and other socioeconomic characteristics, and imply that there 
are structural differences between low-income and middle-income countries 
in the determinants of savings. 
Section 1 1.5 of the paper turns to one country, Korea, to examine some of 
the issues raised in more detail. In particular, the aggregate date suggests that 
most of the changes in aggregate savings are attributable to the household 
sector. However, it is difficult to interpret disaggregated national savings data. 
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This section presents some additional data from surveys of urban and rural 
households’ income and expenditure in Korea. 
The final section provides a summary and concluding remarks. I hope that 
the findings presented in this paper will be provocative and will raise a variety 
of interesting areas for future research. 
11.2 Saving Behavior in 10 Countries 
This section takes a first look at the experiences of the 10 countries. The 
focus is on five sets of variables for each country. The key variable is savings 
as a share of income. How to best measure savings raises a number of impor- 
tant but difficult problems even in developed economies.2 Instead of piecing 
together the details for one or two countries, the objective of this paper was to 
draw inferences for a group of countries over time. Thus, the regressions in 
section 1 1.4 and much of the discussion in this section focus on gross national 
savings as a share of GNP. This variable can be interpreted as a share of total 
national resources available to finance investment. The data sources for each 
country are listed in the appendix. There are clearly shortcomings with this 
indicator; however, none of the alternatives available for these countries, 
given the data limitations, was clearly superior. A number of issues deserve 
mention. 
First, net savings may be more appropriate than gross savings when the 
concern is growth rates and development, since net savings indicates domestic 
resources available for additions to the capital stock. However, net savings 
data were available for only four of the 10 countries-Korea, the Philippines, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. Even in these four, the capital consumption allowance 
seems unreliable. The definitions change frequently. Even in Korea, a country 
with relatively good data, different sources report different aggregate depre- 
ciation series. See Mason (1987) for further discussion of gross versus net 
savings measure for developing countries. 
A second issue is whether to focus on aggregate savings or to disaggregate 
by sector. Although life-cycle theories of saving apply most directly to house- 
holds, there remains an active controversy over the extent to which household 
saving should be treated as independent from corporate and government sav- 
ing. The same issue is relevant for developing countries, with the added twist 
that the line between households and firms is more difficult to draw. When 
disaggregated data exist, the “household sector” is simply the residual once 
government and corporate savings are subtracted from total national savings. 
Accurate information on the size of the “informal” business sector is not avail- 
able. Even though the precise interpretation is unclear, it is interesting to look 
at the trends in different components of savings where data do exist. Strong 
trends within countries over time are likely to be robust and do warrant some 
interpretation. However, differences in the composition of savings across 
countries may primarily reflect differences in definitions and errors in mea- 
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surement. Additional data on household and firm behavior is potentially quite 
informative. Section 11.5 of this paper takes some steps in that direction, 
discussing data from surveys of Korean households. 
Finally, these data do not adequately treat asset valuations (in particular, 
land or housing) or consumption of durables. It is difficult to tell how these 
omissions might bias the existing series. An interesting area for future work 
is to incorporate these corrections for those countries where adequate data are 
available. 
In addition to savings, the discussion below considers four sets of variables: 
real economic growth rates, the age distribution of the population, per capita 
income, and inequality. The discussion of age distribution focuses on the 
share of the population below the age of fifteen (D15). In fact, the results 
change little if the “dependency ratio” is defined more broadly to include the 
share of the population over the age of 65 (D15 + 065). In this sample, most 
of the differences across countries and over time come from the relative im- 
portance of children. The per capita income measures come from Heston and 
Summers’s ( 1988) pioneering work to obtain internationally comparable se- 
ries on real income and prices. These data are measured in 1980 international 
prices. 
Finally, an indicator of income distribution is used for seven of the coun- 
tries. This indicator, from the 1987 World Development Report gives the share 
of income going to the poorest 20% of the population relative to the share 
going to the richest 10% as a measure of income inequality. Measures of in- 
come distribution are well known to be unreliable. Nonetheless, many of the 
discussions about rates of saving focus on the distribution of income, and no 
ideal measures are available. 
The remainder of this section discusses behavior of savings and other key 
variables for the 10 countries. I begin by comparing the “long-run” experi- 
ences across countries, and then I move to a discussion of time trends in indi- 
vidual countries. 
11.2.1 Cross-Country Experiences 
Table 1 1 . 1  shows key variables for each country. Saving rates are averaged 
across 1960-84 (1960-81 in a few cases). The countries are ordered from 
Singapore, the country with the highest average saving rate, at the top, to 
Indonesia, with the lowest rate, at the bottom. The table includes four addi- 
tional indicators: real economic growth rates, per capita income, the depen- 
dency ratio (share of the population age 14 or younger), and the measure of 
inequality. 
The table shows a wide variation in performance across countries. For ex- 
ample, savings rates range from 12% to 24%, while growth rates range from 
4% to 10%. Taiwan and Korea have relatively equitable distributions of in- 
come, while in Turkey and Malaysia the poorest 20% of the population re- 
ceive less than 9% of the income that goes to the richest 10%. However, it is 
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Table 11.1 Key Indicators: 1960-84 
Dependency Ratio 
Real Gross ( 4 5 )  
Savings Real Per Capita Income 
(% GNP)” Growtha 1960b 1980b Incomeb Distribution 
Singapore 
Taiwan 
Malaysia 
Korea 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Hong Kong 
Turkey 
Burma 
Indonesia 
24.3 
23.0 
22.5 
22.0 
21.3 
21.2 
19.1 
16.6 
12.0 
11.9 
8.5 43.2 29.3 
8.8 38.9 33.4 
7.0 51.2 55.6 
9.3 42.9 34.4 
4.2 44.6 44.1 
6.9 44.7 41.9 
10.2 40.9 28.1 
5.2 42.0 39.0 
3.9 38.2 41.2 
5.9 40.7 40.1 
3,481 
1,778 
1,959 
1,429 
1,167 
1,158 
3,643 
1,874 
397 
505 
. . .  
8.8 
20.7 
13.5 
16.9 
17.3 
8.6 
19.4 
Note: See data appendix and text for sources and description. 
‘Period averages. 
bEnd of period. 
Table 11.2 Rapid versus Slow Growth Countries 
Dependency 
Real Gross Savings Real Per 
Growth (% GNP) Capita Income 1960 1980 
Rapid 9.2 22.1 2583 41.5 31.3 
Slow 4.8 15.4 986 41.4 41.1 
Source: See data appendix and text. 
Note: The rapid growth countries are Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. The slow 
growers are Malaysia, Thailand, Burma, and the Philippines. 
important to make two points at the outset. First, by world standards, these 
countries have grown rapidly. The group that we will identify as the slow 
growers had average annual growth rates of 4%-6%. 
Second, most enjoy equitable income distributions. This is especially true 
in Korea and Taiwan which, like Japan, underwent fundamental land reforms 
in the 1940s and 1950s. The income share of the poorest 20% of the popula- 
tion is 9.5% in Taiwan, and averages 5.1% in the other seven countries. In 
comparison, the poorest 20% receive just 3.1% of income in a sample of eight 
Latin American c~unt r ies .~  In only one country, El Salvador, do they receive 
at least the minimum share (3.5%) that they receive in the Asian countries. 
Tables 1 1.2-1 1.4 further explore the relationships between these variables 
and savings rates. Table 1 1.2 compares performance of the four countries with 
growth rates above 8% and the four countries with growth rates below 6%. 
Not surprisingly, the high-growth countries are substantially richer than the 
slow growers. Also, the rapid growers save 40% more income than the slow 
growers. 
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Table 11.3 Savings and Per Capita Income 
Real Per Gross National 
Capita Income” Savings (% GNP) 
Poorest 
Middle 
(excluding Turkey) 
Richest 
45 I 
1,561 
1,498 
3,562 
12.0 
20.9 
21.7 
21.7 
Source: See data appendix and text for sources and description of savings data. 
“These data are average real per capita incomes during 1980-84 (Summers and Heston 1988). 
The poorest countries (Burma and Indonesia) have per capita incomes < $1 ,OOO. The middle- 
income countries have per capita incomes between $1 ,000 and $2,000 and the richest (Singapore 
and Hong Kong) have incomes above $3,000. 
Table 11.4 Income Distribution and Savings 
~ 
Income Gross Savings Real Real Per 
Inequality (or0 GNP) Growth Capita Income 
Equal 18.4 18.6 8.1 1,684 
Equal, excluding Indonesia 18.1 20.7 8.8 2,077 
Unequal 10.3 20.1 5.5 1,667 
Source: See text and data appendix for sources and description. 
Note: Income inequality is the share of income received by the poorest 20% relative to the share 
received by the richest 10%. The countries with relatively equitable income distributions are 
Korea, Indonesia, Hong Kong, and Thailand (labeled “Equal” above). The inequitable ones are 
Malaysia, Turkey, and the Philippines (labeled “Unequal”). 
At the beginning of the period, all of the countries had very similar age 
distributions. However, by the end of the period, there had been no change in 
the dependency ratios in the slow growers but a 25% reduction in the depen- 
dency rates of the rapid growers. In fact, each of the rapid growers experi- 
enced a significant decline (i.e., a drop in fertility rates), and these were the 
only countries in the sample which did. Using the broader measure of depen- 
dency that includes the share of the population over age 65, the rapid growers 
experienced a decline in the dependency ratio from 44.7 in 1960 to 36.1 in 
1980. The comparable figures for the slow growers are 47.6 in 1960 and 49.0 
in 1980. 
Table 11.3 groups countries by per capita income levels. The two poorest 
countries had very low saving rates. However, there is no clear relationship 
between per capita incomes and saving rates among the middle- and upper- 
income groups. When Turkey is excluded from the middle-income group, the 
mean saving rate is 21.7%, exactly the same as for the richest countries. 
While it is not possible to generalize from such small samples, these data do 
not suggest that saving rates rise with income across countries. In the next 
sections we will ask whether there is a relationship between saving and the 
standard of living within a country over time. 
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Table 11.4 compares the countries with relatively equal income distribu- 
tions with the less equitable ones. In the first group, the poorest 20% of indi- 
viduals receive 18% of the income received by the richest 10%. The compa- 
rable number for the second group of countries is just 10%. The table shows 
that, on average using this measure of distribution, there is no relationship 
between income equality and the standard of living. Hong Kong, the richest 
country in the sample, and Indonesia, one of the poorest, have very similar 
indicators of inequality. However, the countries with less equal distributions 
did grow more slowly than the more equitable countries. 
There is also little support for the view that saving is related to income 
distribution. If Indonesia, the only country with distribution data available 
with a per capita income below $1,000, is excluded, saving rates are almost 
identical across the two groups. 
1 1.2.2 Trend Saving Behavior 
Averaging saving rates over a 20-year period masks important changes in 
saving behavior over time. We turn next to a discussion of saving trends in 
individual countries. The discussion divides the 10 countries into four groups. 
The first group is composed of the countries that experienced trend increases 
in saving. The second group is made up of the low-income countries. The 
third includes countries in which saving declined over the sample period. Fi- 
nally, one country, Turkey, does not fit neatly in any of these groups. 
Where available, we also decompose savings into type: government, cor- 
porate, and household. As discussed above, there are some problems with 
these decompositions. In particular, the household sector is typically the re- 
sidual, once government and corporate savings are subtracted from total na- 
tional savings. Therefore, it includes savings of unincorporated businesses, 
which is likely to be important for many developing countries. Furthermore, 
savings exhibits strong positive correlation with real output growth rates in 
most of the countries. While it is not possible to explain this correlation in 
each country, additional data for South Korea shows that there, much of the 
correlation comes from rural households, where savings are closely linked to 
farm inventories. 
Countries with Increasing Savings 
In 1986, savings rates as a percentage of GDP in Singapore (fig. 1 1 .  l ) ,  
Taiwan, and Korea were 46%, 37%, and 33% respectively. However, none of 
these countries began with a high savings rate. Each experienced a dramatic 
in~rease .~  The real question is not why these countries save a lot now, but why 
they experienced significant increases in savings since the 1960s when so 
many other countries did not. 
It is interesting to note that Hong Kong, the richest country in the sample, 
underwent a rapid rise in saving rates from 2% of GNP in 1960 to 34% in 
1976 (see fig. 11.2). However, saving rates have declined since then to ap- 
proximately 25% of income.5 
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Fig. 11.1 SavingdGNP and growth: Singapore 
1965 1970 1975 1980 
Fig. 11.2 SavingdGNP and growth: Hong Kong 
Malaysia began with a higher standard of living than Korea, and with a 
relatively high saving rate. Malaysian saving has trended upward slightly dur- 
ing the period 1960-80 (fig. 11.3). It is interesting to note that Malaysia’s 
average growth rate was 7% during this period as compared to over 9% in 
Korea. Like Korea, Malaysian saving is positively correlated with real growth 
357 Saving Behavior in Ten Developing Countries 
0 
0.3125 - 
0.25 - 
0.1875 - 
/' ._.' :-- . /- ..-- - -- ._ _- 
o ~ ' ' l ~ ' ' l ' ~ ' ' ' ~ ' ' ' ~  I I 
1965 1970 1975 1980 
Fig. 11.3 SavingdGNP and growth: Malaysia 
rates. This may also be attributable to measurement problems from the treat- 
ment of agricultural inventories. 
Savings decompositions are available for two of these high savers: Taiwan 
and Korea. Figures 1 1.4 and 1 1.5 show their savings as a percentage of GNP 
by the government, corporate sector, and households through 1986. 
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Fig. 11.5 Components of savings: Korea 
Turning first to Taiwan, all three components of savings increased as a share 
of income through the 1970s. During the 1980s, government savings dropped 
off, while both corporate and household savings continued to rise. The largest 
increase over the period was in the household sector, where savings rose from 
1.9% of GNP in 1952 to 17.8% in 1986. Corporate savings rose from about 
7% in the 1950s to a high of 15.7% in 1986. 
In Korea, both the trend rise in savings and the large swings in savings 
came from the household sector. The rise is similar to that in Taiwan: house- 
hold savings rose from 2.4% in 1965 to 18% in 1986. However, corporate 
savings remained relatively constant (7%-8% of GNP) since the early 1970s. 
As discussed above, it is difficult to interpret the evidence on the sectoral 
composition of savings. In particular, it is not clear whether the differences in 
corporate savings in these two rapidly growing countries is real or arises from 
the difficulties in distinguishing between households and firms, difficulties 
perhaps exacerbated by tax laws. However, these data do not suggest that high 
saving rates in rapidly growing economies are concentrated in the corporate 
sector. The role of profits and corporate savings in industrialization is an es- 
pecially interesting area for additional analysis. See Murphy, Shleifer, and 
Vishny (1988) for an interesting theoretical discussion. 
The Low Income Countries 
Both Burma and Indonesia had extremely variable, and often negative, real 
growth rates during the early part of the sample. As shown in figures 11.6 and 
1 1.7, they also had low and variable saving rates. However, in recent years, 
performance in both countries more closely resembled performance of the 
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Fig. 11.7 SavingdGNP and growth: Indonesia 
high savers. As real growth rates stabilized, both countries enjoyed a rapid 
rise in saving rates. 
Declining Savers 
Two countries experienced declines in savings rates. In Thailand (Fig. 
11.8), savings rates were subject to large swings and a trend decline. Again, 
most of the movements came from the household sector. 
360 Susan M. Collins 
0.0625 
0.0313 
0 -  
-0.03 I3 
- 
....... .. -.., 
i' '.., .... ---. _ _  --- - - /- ---__ ......... ....... ................ '%. _.I' _sr__- - - - - - -  -___ &--------->; :.---  *"---? -......... -.- - -. ..... ---- ___----____- ---- .......................... ...... . . . . . . . . . .  ...... ...... -... '.._ ..' ........ .... 
- 
I I I I I I I I I I I I  I 1  
Fig. 11.8 Components of savings: Thailand 
O t  
..- 
-0.03131 I ' I " ' I I " I " I ' I " " I ' " I I 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 I985 
Fig. 11.9 Components of savings: Philippines 
In the Philippines, saving rates were approximately constant until the mid- 
1970s and then declined (Fig. 1 1.9). The decline was concentrated in the pri- 
vate sector, with household savings falling from 11% of GNP in 1976 to 7% 
during 1979-81 and just 1% during 1984-86. Corporate savings also de- 
clined, becoming negative by 1985. The fall in savings coincided with a se- 
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Fig. 11.10 Public and private savings: Turkey 
vere deterioration in economic performance. Real growth rates averaged 6.4% 
during 1972-80, plunging to 1.5% during 1981-82 and -5.3% during 1983- 
84. See Dohner and Intal (1989) for a recent analysis of the Philippine eco- 
nomic crisis. 
Other 
Finally, Turkey did not fit any of the above categories. Turkey’s saving rate 
rose during the 1960s and has since stabilized. As shown in figure 11.10, a 
decomposition of Turkish savings is interesting and unusual. Public-sector 
savings were strongly negatively correlated with private savings. 
11.3 A Model of Saving Behavior 
This section uses a simple life-cycle model of household savings to derive 
the equations to be estimated in section 11.4. The approach, which follows 
Fry and Mason (1982) and Mason (1988), emphasizes three aspects of saving 
behavior. 
First, it clearly distinguishes between level and growth effects. In a station- 
ary economy (with no real growth and a constant age distribution) changes in 
the timing of household savings will have no effect on the aggregate savings 
rate as long as households consume their entire lifetime earnings over their 
life cycle. However, there is substantial empirical evidence against this strict 
life-cycle assumption. In fact, households frequently leave positive wealth, 
whether because of uncertainty or the desire to leave bequests. Thus, the 
framework developed below allows for the possibility that lifetime consump- 
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tion is a fraction of lifetime resources, and that the fraction may depend on 
economic and social environment. Changes in this fraction will be called level 
effects on saving. 
Second, the framework shows that the effect of real growth on saving de- 
pends on the mean age at which households earn income relative to the mean 
age at which they consume. In two economies with identical (nonnegative) 
growth rates, one would expect lower saving rates in the one where the mean 
age of consumption was lower relative to the mean age of earnings. 
Third, most factors that influence saving behavior will have both level ef- 
fects and “growth-tilt” effects-effects on the mean age of earnings relative to 
consumption that enter the savings equation interactively with the real growth 
rate. These effects need not have the same sign. Furthermore, econometric 
estimates of the determinants of savings are misspecified if the interactive 
effects are omitted. 
For example, an increase in the dependency rate is likely to reduce the 
mean age of consumption, with little effect on the mean age of earnings in the 
economy. This implies lower saving rates working through the growth-tilt ef- 
fect, provided that there is a positive real growth rate. However, the level 
effect of an increase in the share of the population under age 15 is less clear. 
It may either raise the lifetime consumption of households, reducing savings, 
or raise the share of lifetime earnings the household wishes to leave to future 
generations. The remainder of this section develops a life-cycle model of ag- 
gregate savings. 
Households are characterized by their age and by the year in which they 
were formed. Define w(a,t)  as the earnings of a household at age a which was 
formed at time t. We will refer to this as a household of generation t. Let w(a)  
be the age-earnings profile of the initial household, and assume that the econ- 
omy grows at a constant rate g over time. Therefore, 
(1) w(a,t)  = w(a)e@. 
The present value of earnings for a household of generation t is 
V(t )  = w(a,t)  ecradu. I 
Therefore, in year T ,  the lifetime earnings of an age a household (a household 
of generation T - a )  is 
(3) V(T - a )  = V(T)e-go. 
It is also useful to define y(a,t) as the share of lifetime income households of 
generation t earn at age a. 
(4) y(a,t) = w(a,t)/V(t) .  
In addition, if n(a,t) is the number of age a households in year t ,  then GNP is: 
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X ( t )  = egr n(a,t) w(a) e-ga da. (5) I 
a 
Turning next to consumption, define a(a,t) as the share of lifetime income 
households of generation t consume at age a. As discussed above, we do not 
impose the strict life-cycle assumption, but allow for the possibility that the 
value of income exceeds the value of consumption over the life cycle. The 
consumption of an age a household as a share of GNP in year t is 
a(a,t- a)V(t  - a)/X(t) .  Therefore, aggregate consumption as a share of GNP 
in year t is 
V ( t  - a )  
C(t)  = a(u,t-u)- n(a,t) da. I X ( t )  
a 
Substituting from (3), (4) and ( 5 ) ,  (6) can be rewritten as 
n(a,t) a(a,t-a) e-gada 
= a In(a,t)y(a,t)  e-gada ' 
I 
(7) 
(1 
Taking a linear approximation of (7) around g = 0, the following expression 
for aggregate savings as a share of aggregate income s( t )  is obtained 
where 
py =,J a n(a,t) y(a,t) da 
and 
CI., = a n(a,t) a(a,t-a) da. 
The left-hand side of (8) is approximately equal to the ratio of savings to GNP 
for moderate saving rates. There are two terms on the right-hand side. Here L 
is the level effect. A reduction in consumption relative to income, either be- 
cause of a decline in the share of income consumed over the life cycle or 
because of a shift in the age distribution away from high-consumption house- 
holds, will raise aggregate savings. The second term is the growth-tilt effect, 
which shows that real growth rates enter interactively with the difference be- 
tween the economywide mean ages of consumption and earnings. 
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Finally, we assume that L and (p,, - p,J are simple functions of social and 
economic characteristics, W. 
As discussed further below, the small sample precluded the inclusion of a 
large number of characteristics in the regressions. The included variables (W) 
are a constant, the percentage of the population below the age of 15,(014) and 
per capita income (PCI). The results are not substantially different if the 
broader measure of dependency is used. The variable PCI is taken as a per- 
centage of the per capita income for Hong Kong during 1980-84. Combining 
(8) with (9) and (10) gives a simple log-linear specification that is used in the 
estimations. 
= Po + p, . D14 + (3, PCI + S o .  g 
(11) 
+ 6, * g * D14 + 6, * g - PCI 
11.4 Estimation Results 
Equation (1 1) was estimated using data from the nine Asian economies plus 
Turkey from 1960 through 1984. Because disaggregated data is only available 
for some countries, the aggregate savings rate is used as the dependent vari- 
able. However, for most of these countries, annual savings rates are highly 
correlated with annual growth rates. As discussed above, additional informa- 
tion for Korea suggests that much of the correlation arises from fluctuations 
in inventories of rural households. To minimize these types of relationships, 
data on savings rates, per capita income, and growth were averaged over 
1960-64, 1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-80, and 1980-84. In some cases, aver- 
ages were taken over fewer years (e.g., 1980-82) because of missing values. 
The reported standard errors use the White heteroskedasticity correction, 
since the variance of the errors can be expected to vary with group size. 
Table 11.5 reports the results from two sets of regressions. The first set 
includes all 10 countries. The second set excludes the two low income coun- 
tries, Burma and Indonesia. There was not enough data to run separate regres- 
sions for these countries. Each set consists of two regressions-one with and 
one without the growth interaction terms. 
A comparison of columns 1 and 3 with columns 2 and 4 in table 11.5 shows 
the importance of the growth interaction effects. Even though exclusion of 
these effects causes only a modest reduction in the overall fit, it does severely 
bias the parameter estimates. For example, if they are excluded, the depen- 
dency ratio does not seem to significantly influence saving rates. However, 
once the interaction effects are included, the dependency rates do enter signif- 
icantly for the middle-income countries. 
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Table 11.5 Regression Results 
1 
In  (G) = Po + p, . D14 + P,. PCI + 6 , .  g + 6, . g . D14 + S2. g .  PCI 
All Countries Middle-Income Countries 
1 2 3 4 
Constant .I0 - .31 .15 - .71 
(2.52) (1.31) (2.62) (-1.92) 
014 - .01 .74 - .06 1.40 
(- .17) (1.29) ( -  .74) (2 .09 )  
PCI .23 .60 .21 .95 
(3.42) (3.86) (2.53) (2.27) 
g 1.01 7.25 .78 12.40 
(3.02) (1.82) (2.05) (2.39) 
g.D14 -11.83 - 20.69 
( -  1.27) (-2.04) 
g.PCI -4.79 -8.69 
( -  2.79) (-1.98) 
Adjusted R2 .51 .56 .38 .44 
Number of 43 43 35 35 
Observations 
Source: Data sources are given in the text and the data appendix. 
Note: Estimation Method: ordinary least squares, with heteroskedasticity consistent standard er- 
rors. r-statistics are in parentheses. Variable Definitions: s = aggregate savings/GNP; 014  = 
share of the population aged 14 or younger; PCI = real per capita income, as a share of 1980- 
84 income in Hong Kong; g = real economic growth rate. 
For the middle-income countries, the dependency rate has a positive level 
effect and a negative growth-tilt effect on savings. In other words, given the 
standard of living and the real growth rate, increases in the population share 
of children tend to lower the fraction of lifetime income that a household con- 
sumes over its life cycle. This is consistent with an increased population share 
of children raising household bequests or increasing household precautionary 
savings. 
The positive level effect on savings is offset by the reduction in the mean 
age of consumption in the economy relative to the mean age at which income 
is earned. The magnitude of this offset is tied to the economic growth rate. In 
countries where the growth rate exceeds 6.8%, the negative growth-tilt effect 
dominates, and the net effect of a rise in the dependency rate will be to reduce 
savings. From table 11.1, all of the middle-income countries except Turkey 
and the Philippines had average growth rates above 6.8%. It is interesting to 
note that Fry and Mason (1982) find both level and growth-tilt effects to be 
negative. The relationship between age distribution and saving seems quite 
sensitive to the countries and time period considered. 
When the two low-income countries are included in the sample, the effects 
retain their signs, but the magnitudes decrease and the parameter estimates 
become insignificant. Interestingly, the overall fit in these equations is better 
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than for the middle-income countries alone, because per capita income be- 
comes a more important determinant of saving behavior. The results suggest 
that household consumption over the life cycle is less sensitive to the age 
distribution in poor countries, possibly because a larger percentage of house- 
holds simply consume all of their income, regardless of the household size. 
Similarly, changes in the age distribution seem to have less effect on the mean 
age of consumption relative to income in the poor counties. 
The estimates in table 11.5 also imply that the standard of living (PCI) has 
a positive level effect on savings but a negative growth-tilt effect. The net 
effect (for the middle-income countries) is positive for growth rates below 
10.9%. Hong Kong, the fastest grower in the sample, averaged 10.2% over 
1960-84. Thus, in this sample, countries save more as they get richer even 
though younger households dissave more relative to older households, be- 
cause households consume a smaller share of lifetime incomes over their life 
cycles. 
While the parameter differences are not statistically significant, including 
the low-rncome households seems to reduce the effect of per capita income on 
savings even though its explanatory power rises. One interpretation is that an 
increase in per capita income lowers the share of lifetime income consumed 
over the life cycle by more in the middle-income than in the poor countries. 
The regressions discussed above point to the importance of growth rates, 
per capita incomes, and the dependency ratio as determinants of saving in 
developing countries. The simple equations explain only a modest portion of 
the differences in saving across countries and over time. The next section con- 
siders additional information about saving in Korea, to examine the rapid rise 
in the amount of savings between 1960 and 1986 in more detail. 
11.5 Korean Saving Behavior 
The previous sections used data from national income accounts to examine 
saving behavior in 10 countries. Disaggregation, where available, showed that 
most of the interesting developments in saving were concentrated in the 
household sector. However, the household sector is typically measured as a 
residual, once government and corporate savings have been subtracted out. 
This section discusses household savings in Korea, using data from household 
surveys. There are separate surveys for urban and rural households-surveys 
that have been conducted annually from 1965. However, there have been some 
changes in the sampling procedure. The surveys prior to 1975 are not strictly 
comparable to the more recent surveys. 
Table 11.6 shows savings behavior (disposable income less consumption 
expenditure) for urban and rural households since 1965. As shown, urban 
household savings have risen dramatically to over 20% since 1978. Urban 
savings have been somewhat cyclical, declining during the 1974-75 and 
1980-82 recessions. 
Rural households seem to save substantially more than urban households. 
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Table 11.6 Urban and Rural Household Savings in Korea 
(household survey data) 
Rural Urban + 
Inventory Urban + Adjusted 
Urban Rural Adjusted Rural Rural 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
I975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
-2.2 
3.2 
4.3 
2.6 
3.4 
5.6 
9.2 
12.2 
12.6 
11.2 
9.6 
15.2 
18.9 
21.4 
22.9 
22.5 
21.2 
20.5 
22.9 
24.2 
25.3 
4.4 
10.5 
9.8 
16.1 
17.8 
15.2 
29.0 
24.5 
26.2 
33.2 
26.6 
32.6 
28.9 
26.5 
21 .o 
15.7 
22.7 
22.5 
18.3 
21.8 
17.6 
1.3 
1.1 
1.1 
.4 
4.3 
4.1 
7.9 
4.9 
7.8 
7.9 
7.5 
11.1 
10.4 
13.1 
7.8 
3.6 
3.3 
3.7 
3.1 
2.4 
2.8 
2.8 
8.6 
8.1 
11.3 
12.5 
9.8 
16.0 
15.7 
16.6 
19.0 
14.9 
20.2 
20.4 
21.1 
21 .o 
19.6 
1.2 
4.4 
4.8 
5.2 
7.6 
5.8 
7.7 
8.0 
9.4 
8.6 
7.6 
12.3 
13.7 
16.7 
17.3 
16.5 
Source: Economic Planning Board (Korea), Annual Report on the Family Income and Expendi- 
ture Survey, 1965-86 
Note: It was not possible to calculate the weighted averages of urban and rural savings ratios after 
1980 because data for number of households was unavailable. 
However, rural savings include increases in inventories (especially cereals). 
Excluding this component of savings, rural households savings has averaged 
just 6.5% as compared to 18.6% for urban households. During the 1960s and 
1970s, rural household savings also rose significantly, from 1% to 10% of 
disposable income. However rural savings fell to just 3%-4% since 1979. One 
reason for the drop was the extremely poor performance of the agricultural 
sector during 1978-82, including a 20% decline in real output in 1980. 
The final column of table 11.6 shows combined urban plus inventory- 
adjusted rural savings. The series shows a strong upward trend and is only 
slightly procyclical. The remainder of the discussion focuses on urban house- 
hold savings. 
Figure 1 1.11 shows saving by age of the head of the household since 1975. 
The plot shows that savings have increased at each age level over the past 
decade. This development is consistent with a strong level effect on savings- 
total household consumption has declined as a share of income over the life 
cycle. Possible explanations include the rising life expectancy or a growing 
bequest motive. 
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Fig. 11.11 Household savings by age of head of household: Korea 
The regressions in the previous section suggest that we should also observe 
a rise in the share of total savings accounted for by younger households if the 
mean age of consumption has in fact risen relative to the mean age of earn- 
ings. Instead, the plot points out a puzzle-the savings profile shows evidence 
of flattening out over time. In 1975, saving was quite concentrated among 
households with heads from 25 to 40 years of age. Households with heads 
aged 50-54 were dissaving slightly. By 1986, however, even older households 
saved nearly 18% of their incomes. In this respect, Korea is becoming more 
like Japan, where the saving rate seems to be independent of age. 
The regressions in the previous section suggest that a rising standard of 
living may account for the rising savings. Real incomes have risen dramati- 
cally in Korea, and households with older heads tend to earn higher incomes. 
In 1986, household heads aged 50-54 earned the highest average incomes. To 
explore this channel further, figure 11.12 shows savings rates at a variety of 
real income levels (in constant 1980 won) from 1975-86. The figure was con- 
structed by deflating the average nominal incomes of households grouped by 
nominal income ranges (eg. 100,OOO to 149,000 won, etc.). The plot shows 
that low-income households have continued to save approximately the same 
fraction of their incomes. Thus, not all households saved more in 1986 than 
comparable households in 1975. Of course, the percentage of households in 
the low-income groups has declined over time as Korea’s standard of living 
increased and saving rates rise steeply with household real incomes. The plot 
suggests that households with higher real incomes saved a greater percentage 
of income over time. Unfortunately, this picture may be misleading, because 
the 1975 data averages together all nominal incomes over 110,000 won. In 
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Real Income (thousand won) 
Fig. 11.12 Household savings by income group: Korea 
contrast, the 1980 survey divides incomes between 70,000 and 649,999 won 
into 14 groups and averages incomes over 650,000 won. 
11.6 Concluding Remarks 
Many Asian countries do have high saving rates. However, much more in- 
teresting than the current level is the widespread and dramatic rise in saving 
that has occurred since the early 1960s. The real question then is why savings 
rose in some of these countries, but not in others. This question is explored 
using a panel of data on savings and other key variables for 10 countries since 
1960. 
The paper shows that the countries with the highest saving rates in the 
1980s were also the ones with the fastest real growth rates during 1960-84 
and the ones that underwent a dramatic shift in their age distributions-from 
over 40% under the age of 15 to barely 30%. Interestingly, even the Asian 
countries with moderate saving rates that did not experience large demo- 
graphic shifts exhibit strong correlations between real growth and savings. 
For example, the two low-income countries in the sample experienced low 
and variable growth rates during the years when real growth rates were low 
and erratic. As growth rates stabilized at moderate positive levels, aggregate 
savings rates in both countries began to rise. 
The paper also looks at saving behavior disaggregated into households, cor- 
porations, and government where data are available. These data suggest that 
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most of the movement is concentrated in the household sector. In particular, 
the government does not seem to account for the increases in saving-at least 
not directly. Though provocative, these data suffer from serious measurement 
errors, especially in separating households from firms. Further analysis here 
requires additional data, preferably microlevel panels of firms and house- 
holds. 
Regressions analysis is used to separate out the determinants of savings 
over time and across countries. There are three key findings. First, the popu- 
lation share of children, the standard of living, and the real growth rate all 
enter significantly. Together, they explain a moderate portion of the variation 
in saving behavior. One area for future work will be to expand the sample so 
that additional socioeconomic factors can be entered as explanatory variables. 
Unfortunately, the sample cannot be extended much further in time. While 
additional countries can be added, the results may well be sensitive to the 
included countries. 
Second, the results suggest structural differences in saving behavior be- 
tween the low-income and the middle-income countries. In particular, house- 
hold saving seems to be less sensitive to the age distribution and to changes in 
per capita income in the poorer countries. These findings are consistent with 
previous cross-country studies, which found structural differences between 
industrial and developing countries. 
Third, the explanatory variables influence saving through two separate 
channels. On the one hand, living standards and the age distribution seem to 
have important structural effects on household behavior. On the other hand, 
changes in these variables tilt the mean age of consumption relative to the 
mean age of earnings in the economy. This second channel works interactively 
with the real growth rate. In contrast to some previous studies, the two chan- 
nels are shown to work in opposite directions in this sample. Thus, omission 
of the interaction effects strongly biases the estimation results, suggesting, for 
example, that saving is not affected by the youth dependency ratio. However, 
the net effect for the middle-income countries is that a rise in dependency rates 
reduces saving-more so the higher the real growth rate. Similarly, the net 
effect of a rise in real per capita income is to raise aggregate savings-less so 
the higher the real growth rate. 
Appendix 
Savings Data Sources 
BURMA: National income and gross savings data for 1960-81 were obtained 
from the World Tables (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for the 
World Bank), various issues. HONG KONG: National income and gross savings 
data for 1960-81 were obtained from the World Tables, various issues. 
INDONESIA: National income and gross savings data for 1960-85 were ob- 
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tained from the World Tables, various issues. KOREA: National income and 
gross savings data for 1960-84 were obtained from Economic Planning Board 
(EPB), Economic Statistics, various issues. Urban and rural household sav- 
ings data were obtained from EPB, Annual Report on the Family Income and 
Expenditure Survey, and Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries, Farm House- 
hold Economy Survey, various issues. MALAYSIA: National income and gross 
savings data for 1960-85 were obtained from the International Monetary 
Fund, International Financial Statistics (IFS) and the World Tables, various 
issues. PHILIPPINES: National income data for 1959-86 were obtained from 
the IFS, gross and net savings data were obtained from the Philippine Statis- 
tical Yearbook (Manila: National Economic and Development Authority), var- 
ious issues. SINGAPORE: National income data for 1960-85 were obtained 
from IFS and World Tables, gross savings data were obtained from Yearbook 
of Statistics for Singapore and Economic and Social Statistics for Singapore, 
various issues. TAIWAN: National income and savings data for 1960-86 were 
obtained from Taiwan Statistical Data Book, various issues. THAILAND: Na- 
tional income and savings data were obtained from IFS and World Tables, 
various issues. TURKEY: National income and savings data for 1960-85 were 
obtained from IFS, World Tables, and the Central Bank of Turkey. 
Notes 
1. The World Development Report (World Bank 1987) defines gross domestic sav- 
ings as GDP less total consumption. 
2. See Hammer (1985) for additional discussion of savings measures in cross- 
country studies. Hayashi (1986) provides a useful discussion of particular issues in 
measuring Japanese savings. 
3. The countries are Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, 
Peru, and Venezuela. These data come from World Development Report (World Bank 
1987). 
4. It is interesting to note that Williamson’s (1978) study of Korean savings is en- 
titled “Why Do Koreans Save ‘So Little’?’ 
5. Japanese savings rates also peaked in the 1970s. It would be interesting to ex- 
plore whether this saving pattern could be explained by temporarily high savings (es- 
pecially corporate) during the rapid development phase, or the “big push” as suggested 
by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1988). 
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Comment Anne 0. Krueger 
A number of papers presented at the NBER conference on saving-including 
Sue Collins’s interesting and important contribution-raise fundamental and 
Anne 0. Krueger is Arts and Sciences Professor of Economics at Duke University and a re- 
search associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
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difficult questions about the determinants of economic growth. Historically, 
development economists have examined those determinants for developing 
countries, while others have raised the same questions in the context of the 
OECD countries. There is a great deal to learn by examining the entire range 
of country experiences, especially when it is recognized that some coun- 
tries-including several in Sue Collins’s group-have achieved more growth 
in per capita income in the past two decades than most now-industrialized 
countries did in the entire nineteenth century. This is especially so at a confer- 
ence that focuses on savings and its determinants; some of the countries ex- 
amined by Collins have experienced increases in their saving rates from less 
than 5 percent of GNP 30 years ago to 35 percent and more now. 
Overall, I have little to quarrel with in Collins’s paper. Moreover, the issues 
it raises are issues that have come up in several other papers in this volume, 
and I therefore wish to address some of these broader issues. The basic ques- 
tion that arises-with respect to Christopher Carroll and Lawrence Sum- 
mers’s paper, with regard to Robert Barro’s, and to several others-is What 
are the determinants of growth? And how is growth related to savings? 
Growth as it has been experienced by the rapidly growing newly industrializ- 
ing countries (NICs) of East Asia, and as it was experienced in the nineteenth 
century by the now-developed countries, transforms society. Almost by defi- 
nition, all major economic variables move together. Poverty and low per cap- 
ita incomes are such pervasive constraints on political, social, and economic 
behavior for poor countries that it is unthinkable that it could be otherwise. A 
major problem, therefore, is how to disentangle the simultaneous causation of 
growth from those exogenous stimuli that permit some countries to achieve 
rapid growth in per capita incomes while others grow, at best, slowly or even 
experience declining real per capita incomes and living standards. If, as Larry 
Summers suggested, saving is the activity that reflects the trade-off between 
the present and the future, it is clearly a central concern of those attempting to 
understand economic development and the growth process. 
My unease is that it is not clear what savings we are focusing on and why 
we regard it as an interesting economic variable. To illustrate the basis of my 
concern, a useful starting point is to form the identity that the rate of growth 
of output is equal to the weighted average rate of factor accumulation plus the 
rate of growth of efficiency in factor use. 
The increase in output, dY is equal to the real rate of return on capital, r, 
times the increase in capital stock, dK, plus the return to everything else, w, 
times the change in everything else, d o .  That is, 
dY = rdK + wd0 .  
If we adhere to a conventional notion of savings and capital formation and 
ignore foreign capital inflows (which would not significantly alter the argu- 
ment I want to make), then the rate of growth can be written as 
dYIY = rs + a dOl0 ,  
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where s is savings expressed as a fraction of output, and a is the share of all 
factors other than capital in output. 
The point I wish to make is this: suppose, as Larry Summers’s paper sug- 
gests and is often asserted by others, that the real return to capital does not 
vary much from 5 percent. Then, even with a high saving rate, say .3, the rate 
of growth of output that can be achieved will be only .3  X .05 = .015 or 1.5 
percent. Considering the range of saving rates from .05 to .35 of income, with 
a real return to capital of .05, differences in saving behavior could explain at 
most 1 percentage point of differences in growth rates. Since we observe rates 
of growth of output of 10 and 12 percent in East Asia, and of 1 and 2 percent 
in sub-Saharan Africa, it seems clear that either we are misdefining savings 
and/or investment or the real return, or else savings and investment are rela- 
tively unimportant as determinants of growth. 
Something is clearly wrong. What is it? I think there are several things. 
First, savings finances human capital as well as physical capital formation, 
especially at early stages of growth. Estimates from the human capital litera- 
ture suggest real rates of return of 25 percent on primary education in devel- 
oping countries, and certainly there is evidence that human capital formation 
is a vital component of the growth process. If savings were redefined to in- 
clude expenditures (and forgone income) on human capital formation, the 
saving rates used in our growth equations would look quite different. 
Second, measured savings fails to pick up a number of forms in which 
individuals save, especially in countries where the returns to saving in legal 
channels are low-a point to which I return in a moment. Measured savings 
in most developing countries fails to record capital flight (which is estimated 
cumulatively to have exceeded public external borrowing in a number of de- 
veloping countries in the late 1970s), accumulation of gold (the stock of 
which in India is estimated to have been more than twice national income in 
the 1960s) and other precious metals and minerals, and savings destined for 
investment in the underground economy. 
Third, the real rate of return to investors is a function of several variables, 
and there is a lot of suggestive evidence that it has fluctuated widely between 
countries and over time as a function of incentives afforded by economic pol- 
icies. In Korea, for example, it is estimated that the real rate of return to 
investment in manufacturing exceeded 30 percent during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s; there is ample evidence that it remains very high. In the Korea of 
the 1950s, the evidence suggests that the real rate of return varied a great deal 
depending on the nature of the activity, but probably did not average more 
than 5 percent. 
A final point, which is more relevant to estimating saving responses than it 
is to overall growth rates, is that, in many developing countries, financial 
markets are little developed and governments control the banking system and 
the allocation of credit. In these circumstances, real returns available to small 
savers through the financial system are negative and sometimes strongly so. 
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In Korea, for example, real returns to depositors in savings accounts were 
negative until 1964. 
As these remarks imply, I am skeptical about using measured rates of saving 
as they are recorded in the national income accounts; I am even more skeptical 
about using 5 percent as a real rate of return on capital. While high growth 
rates clearly are a factor contributory to high saving rates in the rapidly grow- 
ing countries, the real return to saving is also a factor, and it is questionable 
whether measurements of that return to date have adequately reflected returns 
to savings. Possibly even more important, factors (and especially govern- 
ments’ economic policies) governing the economic efficiency with which new 
resources are allocated, including the financial markets and the real returns 
they offer to savers, are clearly important in influencing the saving rate and its 
impact on the rate of economic growth. 
Turning specifically to Sue Collins’s paper in light of these considerations, 
I would only raise several issues. First, and most important, she does not 
investigate the role of the real rate of return to savers in affecting saving be- 
havior. Second, she uses period averages as the saving rate for the countries 
involved. A major question there is why the evidence embodied in the very 
large changes in rates over time is not used. Third, I have some questions 
about the “sample” of countries used. Except for Turkey, it is entirely East and 
Southeast Asian-that part of the world (except Indonesia) has been subject 
to a relatively similar set of economic policies and incentives (as contrasted 
with sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, for example): one wonders if the 
procedure is not akin to estimating determinants of height based on a sample 
of professional basketball players. Fourth, and less important, I have some 
misgivings about use of the dependency ratio as Collins uses it: in most rap- 
idly growing developing countries, there is rapid migration from rural to ur- 
ban areas and, with it, a drop in the number of children per family. As such, 
the dependency ratio is to a large extent a variable measuring lagged and cu- 
mulative migration, itself a function of the rate of economic growth. 
Overall, the Collins paper, along with the other presented in this volume, 
provides a valuable contribution to the all-too-sparse literature on determi- 
nants of saving behavior in developing countries. It is to be hoped that her 
effort spurs further work, incorporating better estimates of real returns to sav- 
ers, and alternative estimates of savings that more closely correspond to the 
concept relevant for economic growth. 
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